Trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that guides subsequent investment. We provide a positive theory of disclosure that re ‡ects both functions of the secondary stock market.
Introduction
It has been well established that secondary …nancial markets produce and aggregate information 1 . The extraordinary ability of markets in producing information is exempli…ed in Roll (1984) . The study shows that futures contracts in frozen concentrated orange juice, traded by the New York Cotton Exchange, forecast the weather in central Florida better than the National Weather Service. This implies that the stock price could contain information relevant for, but new to the …rm. Through trading the new information is partially transmitted into market prices and becomes accessible to …rms. Not only do …rms supply information to markets, …rms could also learn information from market prices.
Secondary stock market mobilizes pro…t-seeking traders to e¢ ciently research and generate information about …rms'prospects, including those new even to …rms. Evidence abounds that …rms do use the information in stock prices to guide their investment decisions. For the large scale investments, …rms tend to reverse merge and acquisition decisions when confronted by negative market reactions (e.g., Luo (2005) ) and those who do not are more likely to become the next targets (e.g., Mitchell and Lehn (1990) ). For other less dramatic investments, Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) show that a …rm's capital expenditure and R&D are responsive to the informativeness of its stock prices.
We label it as the informational feedback e¤ect: Firms look to information in stock prices to guide their investment decisions. What implications does this information feedback from …nancial markets to …rms have for corporate disclosure policy? This is the central issue we address in this paper.
Our main result is that disclosure to the secondary market could decrease …rm value in the presence of the informational feedback e¤ect. Preemptive disclosure reduces the information advantage of informed trader and results in less information production by 1 The idea dates back at least to Hayek (1945) . Its application to …nancail markets has received strong support in theoretical, empirical, and experimental work. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Verrecchia (1982a) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , and Kyle (1985) provide models through which trading in …nancial markets transmit information acquired by traders into prices. Rajan and Zingales (2003) contains a survey of the empirical literatures on the informational role of stock market. Plott and Sunder (1982) and Plott and Sunder (1988) con…rm the information aggregation function of prices in a laboratory.
traders. As a result, prices could become less informative to the …rm (even though they may be more informative to outsiders due to the increased …rm disclosure). When the …rm looks into the prices for guidance on investment decisions, the more it has disclosed, the more it sees its own information and the less new information it learns from the prices. The reduced learning results in less informed investment decision and lower …rm value. On the other hand, preemptive disclosure also has a well-established bene…t of ameliorating adverse selection among investors and improving liquidity (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) , see survey in Leuz and Wysocki (2007) ). Therefore, the optimal disclosure policy trades o¤ the cost of disclosure in reducing investment e¢ ciency and the bene…t of disclosure in improving liquidity.
We start with a model in the spirit of Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) that captures the role of preemptive disclosure in levelling the playing-…eld. A …rm with an asset-inplace sets a disclosure policy to maximize …rm value when issuing shares in the primary market. Investors have rational expectations about their future uncertain liquidity needs that can only be satis…ed by trading in the secondary stock market. They also anticipate that they will be taken advantage of in the secondary market by a speculator who acquires costly information and trades anonymously. Anticipating this trading disadvantage investors demand a liquidity discount for the …rm shares in the primary market. The …rm could reduce this liquidity cost by committing more disclosure to the secondary market to preempt the speculator's information advantage, i.e., by leveling the playing-…eld among traders in the secondary market.
We then extend the model by incorporating the two features of the secondary market discussed at the beginning of this Introduction. First, the speculator acquires some information that could be new even to the …rm. That is, the speculator's information set is not a subset of the …rm's. The new information the speculator acquires is transmitted to stock price through trading. Second, in addition to the asset-in-place, the …rm in our model has a growth opportunity whose future cash ‡ow depends on an investment decision made by the …rm after observing the stock price in the secondary market. Thus the …rm could look into stock prices to guide its investment. With these two features, the stock price both re ‡ects and a¤ ects …rm value. Speculative information acquisition that exacerbates illiquidity in the secondary market is also a source of useful information the …rm looks to guide its investment decisions. A leveled playing-…eld could reduce …rm value because the stock price becomes less informative to the …rm.
By explicitly incorporating the informational feedback role of the stock price, our model enriches the literature on disclosure to the secondary market. More private information production by traders is often viewed as a proxy for the health of a stock market (Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) ) and thus a desirable goal pursued by …rms and regulators. One trend in securities regulation in the United States in the past four decades has been to promote disclosure and facilitate private information acquisition at the same time (e.g., Stout (1988) , Mahoney (1995) ). Our model explains that both measures improve …rm value when learning from the stock price is important for …rms. In contrast, if disclosure is mainly designed to improve liquidity, we would have predicted that the second measure, encouraging speculative information acquisition, reduces …rm value.
In addition to the reconciliation of disclosure policies with other prominent features of securities regulation, our model also generates new testable predictions. First, the model predicts that growth …rms are endogenously more opaque than value …rms because learning from the prices is more important for growth …rms. Second, the model predicts that disclosure quality is higher in deeper markets. Market depth and the distortion in the disclosure policy work as substitutes in providing incentive for the speculator to acquire information.
We also discuss two extensions of the baseline model. First, we compare this mechanism with other mechanisms of information production, such as corporate information system, consulting services, and internal prediction markets. We identify the types of information the secondary market has competitive advantage in producing. Second, …rm value is a¤ected by the actions of a …rm's other stakeholders. The informational feedback e¤ect also works to the extent that those actions are adapted to the information conveyed by stock prices.
Our paper belongs to a growing literature that explicitly model the informational feedback e¤ect of stock price to shed new light on traditional issues, such as market-based policy making (Sunder (1989) , Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) ), project selection (Dye and Sridhar (2002) , Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2010) ), insider trading (Khanna, Slezak, and Bradley (1994) ), public vs. private …nancing (Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) ), securities design and capital structure (Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) ), and ownership structure (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) ). Collectively, this literature shows that the informational feedback role of the secondary stock market could not be taken as granted.
How the informational e¢ ciency of prices translates into allocational e¢ ciency depends on the speci…cs of the decision problems. The modeling device of the informational feedback e¤ect and the novel information structure in our model are useful for the future endeavor in this direction 2 .
Our paper compliments the literature of the real e¤ects of accounting disclosure (as reviewed by Kanodia (2007) ) that emphasizes on the two-way impacts between …rm decisions and capital market pricing. Our paper contributes to this literature by introducing a new link from the secondary stock market to the …rm's subsequent real decisions, namely, the informational feedback link. The …rm's real decisions respond to the stock price because the …rm learns new information from the stock price.
Our paper also relates to a vast literature on the monitoring bene…t of the secondary stock market (Diamond and Verrecchia (1982) , Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) , Kanodia and Lee (1998) ). The stock price in ‡uences the manager's decisions because the …rm links his compensation to the stock price to exploit the informativeness of the stock price. The monitoring role is absent from our model because 2 Take insider trading as an example. One argument for insider trading is that it improves economic e¢ ciency by impounding more information to stock price (Manne (1966) ). However, our model implies that whether the increased informational e¢ ciency leads to alloctional e¢ ciency depends on the speci…cs of the informational feedback e¤ect. If the insider trading is based on the undisclosed …rm information, the …rm is served better with a policy of more disclosure and restricting insider trading. But if the insider trades on information that is outside of the scope of the …rm's information system, such trading might be justi…ed on the ground of economic e¢ ciency.
we assume away the agency con ‡ict. The major di¤erence between the monitoring role and the informational feedback role of the stock price is that each exploits a di¤erent type of information. The monitoring role relies on the backward-looking information about the past action of the manager, while the informational feedback role takes advantage of the forward-looking information. In fact, information about the future often impedes the monitoring role of the stock price (Paul (1992) ).
Finally, our paper also adds to the literature on the interactions between public disclosure and the private incentive to acquire information (Demski and Feltham (1994) , Kim and Verrecchia (1994) , McNichols and Trueman (1994) ). They identify conditions under which disclosure could stimulate private information acquisition. But the information feedback to the real decisions subsequent to the trading is absent in these papers.
Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 highlights the basic trade-o¤ of the model and Section 4 present the main analysis, including the extensive comparative statics. In Section 5 we discuss some key assumptions of the model and extensions to the baseline model. Section 6 concludes. Detailed proofs are presented in the Appendix.
The Model
We start with a model in which disclosure mitigates adverse selection among traders. We then incorporate the informational feedback role of the secondary market into the model to study its e¤ects on the optimal disclosure policy. Towards this goal, we explicitly model two features of the secondary market. First, some information that is otherwise unknown to the …rm could be produced by the market and transmitted to the …rm through stock price. Second, the …rm uses the information in stock price to guide its decisions that in ‡uence the distribution of its cash ‡ow.
Consider a …rm that consists of one asset-in-place (AIP) and one growth opportunity.
The terminal cash ‡ow from the AIP is
A 0 is the certain component of the cash ‡ow and e is the uncertain component. e is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 , i.e., e N (0; 2 ). The terminal cash ‡ow from the growth opportunity is
K is the …rm's investment decision to be speci…ed later. By construction e A and e G share the same source of uncertainty e . 3 The di¤erence is that the distribution of e G is endogenous to the investment decision K while the distribution of e A is …xed exogenously. We now specify the investment decision that determines the distribution of e G:
All parties are risk neutral and the risk-free rate of return is normalized to be 1. There are four dates and the time line is as follows.
Date 1 2 3 4
The …rm chooses Speculator acquires a signal; The …rm observes Cash ‡ow a disclosure quality The …rm makes disclosure; stock price and is realized.
to maximize …rm value. Liquidity shocks realized; chooses investment.
Firm shares traded in secondary market. At date 1, the …rm sets the disclosure policy to maximize …rm value. The disclosure policy commits the …rm to fully disclose its information at date 2 with probability before the secondary market opens. With probability 1 , nothing is disclosed. thus measures the quality of disclosure. After setting the disclosure policy, the …rm issues equity shares to a continuum of ex ante identical investors. Investors have rational expectations. They expect stochastic liquidity shocks at date 2 that can only be satis…ed by trading in the secondary market. The total mass of investors is normalized to be unity and and the total number of shares is normalized to be 1 share per capita.
At date 2; the …rm makes the disclosure, the speculator acquires information, and then the secondary market for …rm shares opens. The …rm privately learns a signal e z at no cost. e z reveals e perfectly with probability f and is uninformative at all with probability 1 f . Exogenous parameter f measures the quality of the …rm's internally available information. Recall that the …rm's choice of disclosure quality commits the …rm to disclose its information perfectly with probability : The actual disclosure at date 2, denoted as e x; is e x 8 > < > :~ with probability f ? with probability 1 f ? denotes the empty set. Note that f measures the total amount of information disclosed by the …rm. We refer both and f as …rm disclosure level and use them interchangeably whenever no confusion could arise. To focus on interior solutions, we assume that the …rm incurs a cost w 2 f 2 and that w is su¢ ciently large 4 5 .
The speculator expands resources to acquire information at the same time or before 4 Our results are qualitatively the same when we use di¤erent cost functions
The cost function w 2 f 2 has the nice interpretation that the …rm only incurs the disclosure cost when the …rm receives the information.
5 The …rst part of Assumption 2 ensures that the equilibrium choice of is always smaller than 1 and the second part of Assumption 2 ensures that the equilibrium choice of is always positive. Together Assumption 2 ensures that the equilibrium choice of is interior, i.e., 2 (0; 1) the disclosure comes out. Speci…cally, the signal the speculator acquires, e y, is an unbiased signal of e : e y = e + e " y :
e " y is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 y , i.e., e " y N (0; 2 y ). De…ning the quality of signal e y as The more resources the speculator expands, the more precise her signal is. We assume that c is su¢ ciently large so that the equilibrium information acquisition is interior, i.e.,
Both Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are imposed throughout the paper.
The secondary market opens after disclosure by the …rm and the information acquisition by the speculator. Three parties participate in the secondary market through a
Kyle setting: the speculator, investors, and a market maker. The speculator submits an information-based order d(x;ỹ): Investors who experience liquidity shocks submit an aggregated liquidity-motivated order e n. e n is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 n , i.e., e n N (0; 2 n ) 6 . It could be veri…ed that the optimal strategy for investors who do not experience liquidity shocks is not to trade. In addition to the disclosure x, the market maker also observes the total order ‡ow e n + e d but cannot di¤erentiate the two components. The market maker then sets a price P to clear the market and to break even.
For technical reasons to be discussed in detail in Section 5.1 and following Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), we focus only on the trading of shares that have claims against the AIP. That is, we implicitly assume that the claims against the cash ‡ow from the growth opportunity are not traded. As a result of this assumption, the price set by the market 6 One interpretation could be that the liquidity shock requires each investor i, i 2 [0; 1], to place a market order of e n + e "i where e n represents the market-wide shock and is common to all investors and e "i represents non-systematic, mean-zero iid shocks. The market-wide shock e n is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 n : The idiosyncratic shocks across investors sum to zero (
e "idi = 0 with probability one). Thus, the total order from investors sums to e n.
maker is
Two remarks are in order about the information structure of our model. From the perspective at date 1 when the disclosure policy is made, the speculator's information is correlated with the …rm's but not a subset of the …rm's. First, …rm disclosure e x is correlated with the speculator's information e y. As shown in the …rst row of Table 1 , with probability f ; e x completely preempts the speculator's information advantage e y and the information ‡ows one-way from the …rm to the market. Second, the speculator does have some information that could be new to the …rm. In the last row of Table 1 , with probability 1 f; the …rm does not learn anything internally about e but the speculator has a noisy signal about e : The information ‡ows from the market (speculator) to the …rm through the stock price. Ex ante (at date 1), the information ‡ow is two-way between the …rm and the market (speculator). e + e " y P (e y) Table 1 At date 3; the …rm choose an investment level K based on all available information (z; e P ): By our information structure, e P is not always redundant to the …rm in choosing K. As a result, the distribution of the cash ‡ow from the growth opportunity could be in ‡uenced by the incremental information in e P . This is the informational feedback e¤ect.
At date 4; the cash ‡ow of the …rm is realized and consumption takes place.
In summary, at date 1 when the …rm chooses disclosure policy to maximize …rm value, the …rm value could be written as follows:
is the expected cash ‡ow of the AIP that is independent of …rm disclosure:
is the liquidity loss investors expect to incur when they trade with the speculator in the secondary market to satisfy their liquidity needs at date 2: This liquidity cost is equal to the speculator's expected gross pro…t, due to the zero-sum nature of the trading process.
Since investors break even and thus are price-protected in the primary stock market, the …rm bears the full consequences of investors'expected date-2 liquidity loss . For given information acquisition and disclosure quality ,
When disclosure reveals e perfectly, which occurs with probability f; the speculator does not trade (d(e y; e x = e ) = 0) and earns zero gross pro…t. Otherwise, the speculator chooses the information-based order d(e y; e x = ?) to maximize the expected pro…t.
The third component in eqn. 1 is the expected value of the growth opportunity, taking into account the fact that the optimal investment decision would adjust to new information learned at date 2 (including both internal information e y and stock price e P ):
Finally, f w condition:
3 The Basic Trade-o¤
Disclosure levels the playing-…eld by preempting the speculator's information advantage.
The levelled playing-…eld reduces the liquidity cost on one hand but reduces the investment e¢ ciency on the other hand. This is the basic trade-o¤ of the disclosure policy.
Lemma 1 Disclosure levels the playing-…eld: Higher (lower) disclosure quality leads to lower (higher) information acquisition by the speculator in equilibrium, that is,
This is the familiar argument that disclosure levels the playing-…eld. The adverse selection is measured by the information asymmetry between the speculator and the marketmaker. The speculator's information advantage comes from the acquired private information e y with quality . As we show in the Appendix, the speculator chooses information quality to maximize her expected net trading pro…t:
As the …rm increases disclosure quality ; it is more likely that the information the speculator acquires overlaps with the …rm's disclosure and thus is useless for trading. As a result, higher disclosure quality lowers the level of information acquisition by the speculator and results in a more leveled playing-…eld in the secondary market.
The leveled playing-…eld, however, creates a trade-o¤ for …rm value, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In addition to the e¤ ect on the direct cost, disclosure, by leveling the playing-…eld, has two countervailing e¤ ects on …rm value.
1. Higher (lower) disclosure quality reduces (raises) the liquidity cost the …rm incurs, that is,
2. Higher (lower) disclosure quality reduces (raises) the value of the growth opportunity, that is,
The …rst e¤ect on the liquidity cost is an immediate consequence of a more leveled playing-…eld because
This bene…t of disclosure has been well established in the literature (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) , Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) , see Leuz and Wysocki (2007) for a survey). Private information acquisition by the speculator is the root cause of illiquidity and the motivation for the preemptive corporate disclosure (e.g.,Verrecchia (1982b), Diamond (1985) ). It redistributes wealth from investors (and eventually from the …rm) to the speculator and in the process the resources spent on information acquisition are wasted from the social perspective. Hence, full disclosure ( = 1) would be socially desirable absent the direct disclosure cost
The informational feedback e¤ect imparts a positive social value to the pro…t-driven speculative information acquisition, as the second e¤ect of disclosure shows in Proposition 1. The reduction in information acquisition by the speculator, resulting from the increased disclosure, makes the price less informative to the …rm when it looks into stock prices to guide its investment. As a result, the e¢ ciency of the investment decision at date 3 is hurt.
Recall the optimal date-3 investment level, K (z; P ) = arg max
Parameter g captures the degree to which the …rm could adapt its investment to new information: a higher g leads to a higher value of the growth opportunity. With probability f , the …rm chooses date-3 investment based only on internally generated information (e z = e ). The stock price P is redundant. However with probability 1 f , the …rm does not learn e internally and does bene…t from the information in the stock price P . Our information structure enables us to reach a closed-form solution for :
While the …rm always fully enjoys the bene…t of internal information (measured by f ), the …rm only infers information from price P with noise. More information acquired by the speculator (i.e., higher ( ) in equation 3) improves the value of the growth opportunity.
By Lemma 1 it is straightforward to show that …rm disclosure reduces investment e¢ ciency:
The basic trade-o¤ of the disclosure policy highlights the dual functions of the secondary market. Not only does the secondary market provide liquidity to traders, it also generates new information that could improve investment e¢ ciency. Preemptive disclosure could not serve both functions at the same time and thus a disclosure policy that maximizes …rm value does not narrowly promote a more levelled playing-…eld. Put di¤erently, the information feedback is not provided to the …rm for free. Eventually the …rm pays for the information production service by the speculator in the form of the increased liquidity cost of its shares resulting from reduced disclosure. The more valuable the information provided by the speculator, the more the …rm's disclosure policy is pulled back from fully addressing the liquidity concern. We explore these results in detail in next section.
More broadly, Proposition 1 also reveals the subtlety in the mechanism through which disclosure improves allocational e¢ ciency. Disclosure does not improve allocational e¢ -ciency simply because it improves informational e¢ ciency of the stock price. For example, the stock price P is less informative in the second row of Table 1 than in the …rst row; however, the allocational e¢ ciency of the two cases is the same. The intuition is that in our model nothing prevents the …rm from using the undisclosed internal information.
This observation is important because the vast literature following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) on how the informational e¢ ciency of the price is in ‡uenced by various institutions (including disclosure) has often taken it as granted that price informativeness improves resource allocation. The observation also has immediate implications for the broad policy debates that are mainly predicated on informational e¢ ciency (see the example of insider trading in Footnote 2).
Main Analysis
We now examine the implications of the basic trade-o¤ identi…ed in Proposition 1. First, we use the model to reconcile policies that encourage …rm disclosure and facilitate private information acquisition at the same time. Second, we analyze the determinants of the optimal …rm disclosure policy to generate testable empirical hypotheses.
Promoting Firm Disclosure and/or Private Information Acquisition
The legal literature has established that the tenet of securities regulation in the United
States has shifted to the "e¢ ciency enhancement model" since 1970's as part of the triumph of the E¢ cient Market Hypothesis (e.g., Stout (1988) , Mahoney (1995) ). Under the guidance of this new doctrine institutions and policies have been designed to facilitate the information production in the secondary market. In addition, more private information acquisition by traders is also often viewed as a proxy for the health of a stock market (Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) ) and thus a desirable goal pursued by …rms and regulators.
However, the e¤ort to encourage speculative information production would seem paradoxical if we focus only on the liquidity provision role of the secondary market. In absence of the informational feedback e¤ect, the costly pro…t-driven information acquisition by the speculator merely redistributes wealth among traders. As such it is a negative-sum game and could be mitigated by two types of policies. One is to reduce the disclosure cost for the …rm, but the other is to increase, rather than decrease, the information acquisition cost for the speculator. This paradox is resolved by the introduction of the informational feedback e¤ect, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the informational feedback e¤ ect is strong (g > g ), a …rm-valuemaximizing policy promotes disclosure (lower w) and facilitates speculative information acquisition (lower c) at the same time. When the informational feedback e¤ ect is weak (g < g ), a …rm-value-maximizing policy promotes disclosure but discourages speculative information acquisition. That is,
Proposition 2 reconciles the dual e¤orts to promote information acquisition (lower c ) and disclosure (lower w) at the same time by …rms and regulators alike. When the informational feedback e¤ect is important for a secondary market, both the cost of illiquidity and the bene…t of learning from stock prices a¤ect …rm value. The optimal policy response is to lower the information acquisition cost to make the stock prices more informative on one hand and to increase …rm disclosure to address the concern of the heightened adverse selection on the other hand.
Growth and Disclosure Quality
The basic trade-o¤ in Proposition 1 points to growth factors that increase the value of the informational feedback e¤ect, which in turn create incentives for …rms to reduce disclosure quality in order to preserve the speculator's incentive to acquire information. In our model, growth is represented by
Each of the relevant exogenous parameters, g, f , and 2 ; captures one facet of a growth …rm. Their e¤ects on disclosure policy are summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Ceteris paribus, 1. …rms with higher growth prospect (higher g) disclose less;
2. …rms that are more likely to learn information from the stock price (lower f ) disclose less;
3. …rms with higher uncertainty (higher 2 ) disclose less if and only if g is large.
As growth prospect g increases, information about the pro…tability of the growth opportunity becomes more valuable to a …rm. Thus, the …rm reduces disclosure quality to make the information acquisition by the speculator more pro…table, which in turn incentivizes her to acquire more information.
The necessity of learning from the stock price originates from the fact that the …rm may not have relevant information at times. As f increases, it is less likely that the information the speculator acquires is new to the …rm. As a result, the speculative information acquisition is of less value for the …rm. Since the information acquisition still imposes a liquidity cost on the …rm, the …rm increases disclosure to reduce the liquidity cost.
The variance of the uncertainty~ a¤ects the value of the information to both the …rm and the speculator. On one hand, as 2 increases, the marginal bene…t of learning by the …rm becomes larger. The …rm reduces disclosure to encourage more information acquisition by the speculator. On the other hand, as 2 increases, the speculator's information acquisition becomes more pro…table because her information gives her a bigger informational advantage. This leads to a higher liquidity cost for the …rm and induces the …rm to improve disclosure quality. Since the …rst e¤ect increases in g while the second is independent of g; the …rst e¤ect dominates the second as g is large. Hence, the …rm's disclosure quality increases in 2 if and only if g is small. shows that growth …rms disclose less to the extent that it is less likely for the growth …rms to receive information (lower f ) or it is more costly for the growth …rms to disclose its information (higher w). We further demonstrate that the opaque nature of growth …rms could be explained by the informational feedback e¤ect. Growth …rm discloses less because they are more eager to learn from the stock price and thus are more willing to bear the liquidity cost in order to encourage speculative information acquisition.
Market Depth, Information Cost, and Disclosure Quality
The basic trade-o¤ in Proposition 1 also points to environmental factors that a¤ect the speculator's incentive to acquire information, which in turn a¤ects the …rm's disclosure policy. We examine the impact of model parameters, c , w, and 2 n on the equilibrium disclosure quality .
Proposition 4 Ceteris paribus, 1. …rms in markets/countries with low direct disclosure cost (w) disclose more; 2. …rms in markets/countries with high liquidity demand variance ( 2 n ) disclose more;
3. …rms in markets/countries with low information acquisition cost (c) disclose more if and only if g is large.
As expected, direct disclosure cost (w) has a negative impact on the optimal disclosure policy. Parameter 2 n measures the size of the liquidity-motivated trades in the market and is thus a measure of the market depth. An increase in the market depth ( 2 n ) reduces the speculator's price impact and makes her information acquisition more pro…table. This enhanced pro…tability serves as a substitute for the incentive provided by the distortion in the disclosure policy. Therefore, …rm raises disclosure quality to address the liquidity concern in response to an increase in 2 n .
The e¤ect of c on disclosure quality is complicated. As c changes, the marginal e¤ect of disclosure on both liquidity cost and growth opportunity are a¤ected. When growth is important (g is large), the value of the growth opportunity is more sensitive to changes in c than the liquidity cost is. As a result, a decrease in c generates a net marginal cost of disclosure (the marginal cost due to less learning dominates the marginal bene…t arising from a lower liquidity cost). Thus the …rm reduces in response. As a result, a lower information acquisition cost for the speculator leads to higher disclosure by the …rm in markets where the informational feedback e¤ect is important.
Discussions and Extensions
In this section, we discuss a key technical assumption we have made in the model, namely, we focus only on the trading of the AIP. We then discuss two possible extensions to the baseline model. One is to compare our mechanism with other information production mechanisms and the other is for other participants in the market to adapt their decisions to the information in the stock price.
Focusing on the trading of the AIP
In setting up the trading in the secondary market, we have made the assumption that we focus only on the trading of shares that have claims against the AIP. Alternatively we could assume that the claims against the cash ‡ow from the growth opportunity are not traded in the model. This assumption is made to address a technical issue arising from our model that combines together the information aggregation process and the informational feedback e¤ect. In a typical trading model focusing on information aggregation, the distribution of …rm value is pre-determined and information only in ‡uences traders'estimates about the …rm value. As a result, the stock price only re ‡ects but does not directly a¤ect the …rm value. Optimal trading decision and rational pricing function are solved by conjecturing linear equilibria and verifying the linear conjectures are indeed rational. However, in the presence of the informational feedback e¤ect, like in our model, the …rm value also derives from the growth opportunity whose value in turn depends on the information aggregated in the stock price. Thus, the stock price not only re ‡ects but also a¤ ects the …rm value. As a result, the stock price or the expected …rm value are not linear in signals. For example, in our model the expected value of the growth opportunity, ; is not linear in the signals (see eqn. 3). While we are still able to determine the equilibrium …rm value, the inference about the private signals based on the non-linear price becomes not tractable 7 .
One solution in the literature is to de-couple the information aggregation problem from the informational feedback e¤ect (e.g., Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2010) ). We adopt this approach and follow the modelling device in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) . As in their model, we assume that the …rm value derives from both the AIP and the growth opportunity. However, only the trading of AIP is explicitly modeled. One interpretation is that the …rm sells the AIP in the primary market and retains control over the growth opportunity. This explains the composition of …rm value in eqn. 1. Since the terminal cash ‡ows of the AIP and the growth opportunity are subject to the same sources of uncertainty (e ); the prices of two components would be linked to each other in a deterministic manner and share similar informational properties.
The information about~ learned from the trading of the AIP is then used by the …rm to improve the decisions on the growth opportunity. This preserves both the information aggregation through trading and the information feedback of prices 8 .
The other solution in the literature is to focus on a restrictive setting with binary signals and actions (e.g., Goldstein and Guembel (2008) , Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott (2010) ). We have also veri…ed that the basic trade-o¤ between the liquidity cost and investment e¢ ciency is preserved in a version of the model in which both the private signal and investment decision are binary. As a result, the price or the expected …rm value are discrete and the inference could be made in the presence of the informational feedback e¤ect. The downside of the alternative speci…cation is that most analyses become binary and discrete as well.
Who is the most e¢ cient information provider?
We have made the point that the information production by the …nancial market is not free for the …rm. Eventually the …rm pays for the information it learns from the stock price in the form of a higher liquidity cost. We further explore the mechanism by comparing it with the hypothetical case in which the …rm has access to the same information production technology as the speculator.
Proposition 5 If the …rm could use the same technology the speculator has to acquire information the …rm chooses^ . Compared with this benchmark case the information production in our baseline model is too low when the growth prospect is high and too high when the growth prospect is low.
This stark result reveals the suboptimal nature of the information production through the secondary stock market. The e¢ ciency loss originates from the misalignment of the speculator's private incentive with the …rm's. The speculator's interest in trading pro…t is not congruent with the …rm's interest of improving investment e¢ ciency. As a result, there is a wedge between the marginal bene…t of information production for the …rm (the social value) and for the speculator (private value). The social value of information depends on the importance of the growth opportunity. Since the private value of the information is invariant to its social value, the private incentive produces too little information when it is needed and too much information when it is not needed.
Alternative to using the stock market as an information source, the …rm could also hire outside consultants or set up internal organizations to produce information. These mechanisms su¤er well-known and well-studied agency problems in the contractual relationship.
One would expect di¤erent mechanisms specializing in di¤erent types of information. The market mechanism has competitive advantage for information that is subject to severe agency issues. These include information that is di¢ cult to be quanti…ed, information not incentive-compatible for direct revelation by the information owner/producer, and information whose most e¢ cient provider could be not easily identi…ed.
A hybrid may be predictions markets setup within organizations. With a goal of improving decision-making at the top, large and decentralized …rms such as HewlettPackard, Microsoft, and Google have used prediction markets to generate forward looking information. Hypothetical securities are created and traded among employees in order to stimulate information production and transmission of forward-looking information. Their main di¤erences from the stock market are that prediction markets are designed for a particular event (e.g., sales outcome) and that they typically exclude non-employees from participating, thus limiting both the scale and the scope of prediction markets as an information generator/transmitter. As a result, compared to the stock market, predictions markets have the bene…t of focusing on speci…c events but the disadvantage of low liquidity and lower incentive for traders to generate information.
Who is learning?
We emphasize that the basic trade-o¤ between the liquidity cost and investment e¢ ciency can exist even if it is not the …rm who learns the information in the stock price. As long as the information in the stock prices in ‡uences any decisions, made by the …rm or not, that a¤ect …rm value, the …rm's disclosure policy will optimally consider the e¤ect of disclosure on the production of information in the stock price. Examples of such decisions include new equity investors'pricing decision in a seasoned o¤ering that a¤ects the cost and the amount of capital the …rm could raise, competitive lenders deciding additional capital to provide or withdraw (to call an existing loan), employees deciding investment in …rm-speci…c human capital, or suppliers and customers deciding their relationship-based investment with the …rm.
A common feature of these examples is that better decisions made by these outsiders bene…t the …rm, and more information available at date 3 improves the e¢ ciency of these decisions and raise …rm value ex ante. To illustrate, suppose an outsider makes the investment decision K to maximize own payo¤ e G = e K 1 2g K 2 : Assume the …rm bene…ts from the outsider's decision by an amount H( e G) = h e G where h > 0. If these decisions are important enough for the …rm, the main intuition that the …rm's disclosure policy faces a trade-o¤ remains for these examples.
Proposition 6 When outsiders make investment decisions instead of the …rm, if f is small (such that
3 ), then disclosure, by leveling the playing-…eld, still has two countervailing e¤ ects on …rm value.
2. Higher (lower) disclosure quality reduces (raises) the …rm's bene…t from outsiders' investment, that is,
The main di¤erence in details is that disclosure will take on an additional role absent in the baseline model. When the decision maker is not the …rm, public disclosure directly transmit the …rm's internal information to the outside decision maker. As a result, …rm disclosure not only levels the playing-…eld (which leads to two countervailing e¤ects) but also directly facilitates the outsider to make better decision. As a result, the …rm would only back o¤ from full disclosure when its internal information is limited (thus equilibrium speculator information advantage is large).
Moreover, we can extend the model to consider a special case where it is the competitors who learn from disclosure and stock price before making their decision that could reduce the value of the disclosing …rm (Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1986) and Gigler (1994) ). In the Proposition 6 illustration, this would amounts to h < 0. With the private incentive for information production this extension adds a novel perspective to the literature on proprietary cost of disclosure. That is, more disclosure could lower proprietary cost, a similar result to Arya and Mittendorf (2005) but with a di¤erent mechanism. Even though disclosure provides information to the competitors, it also reduces the speculator's incentive to acquire information that the competitors could learn from the stock price.
There are conditions under which the overall information learned by the competitors is lower with more disclosure by the …rm.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a positive theory of corporate disclosure policy which balances the concerns for reducing adverse selection and for encouraging information production, both in the secondary stock market. The key feature is the informational feedback e¤ect of the stock price. The main insight from our analysis is that such an e¤ect generates an endogenous cost to corporate disclosure. The many comparative statics results correspond to the institutional features and empirical results in the literature.
The main conclusion of the study is that market can serve an irreplaceable role of information production and transmission in an economy and as such, it is a strength of a market-based economic system. Further, this particular role is more prominent and more valuable in an economy where cost of information acquisition is low (better legal protection of property right or corporate governance) and the growth of the economy depends more on information outside the …rm (an open and entrepreneurial economy). Finally, corporate disclosure is critically important because disclosure policies a¤ect and are a¤ected by the information production and transmission by the stock market. 
The …rm value at date 1 is expressed in eqn. 1. We solve for each component in turn.
is the expected gross pro…t of the speculator, which is equal to the expected liquidity cost for the …rm. Given the …rm's disclosure quality and the quality of the speculator's information acquisition ; ( ; ) = (1 f ) ( ):The speculator makes a pro…t of ( ) from her information ex post only in two events: 1) the …rm does not receive the information about~ ; 2) the …rm receives the information but does not disclose it. The total probability of these two events is 1 f: ( ) is obtained from solving the trading game in the secondary market at date 2:It is a standard Kyle model with one speculator, one market-maker, and liquidity traders. The terminal value of the claim is e A = A 0 + e , the speculator has private information e y = e +" over the market maker, and the aggregate liquidity trade isñ. Using standard solution techniques for Kyle-model (details available upon request), we get the following results: The …rst-order condition yields the optimal information acquisition
The second-order condition , c < 0, is satis…ed. Note that ( ) is always nonnegative. A su¢ cient condition for 1 is that ( )j =0 1; or n 2c c; which is Assumption 2 in the paper.
The speculator's expected gross pro…t as a function of information acquisition is 2 ( f + (1 f ) ) < 0: We now turn to ;the expected value of the growth opportunity at date 1: Notice the information available to the …rm on date 3 as fe z; P g: = E[max K E[G(K)je z; P ]]: depends on the …rm's investment decision K on date 3;which in turn depends on fe z; P g: On date 3;the …rm chooses K to maximize the expected value ofG given information available to the …rm:
The …rst-order condition gives the optimal investment decision K (e z; P ) :
The second-order condition, @ @K (E[Gje z; P ]) < 0, is satis…ed. The optimum is a function of fe z; P g : E[G(K )je z; P ] = g 2 (E[~ je z; P ])
2 When e z = e , the …rm receives the perfect signal about~ and would ignore information in price P when making the investment decision. This case occurs with probability f . Otherwise, e z = ?, the …rm only learns about~ from the stock price P . Therefore, the expected value of the growth opportunity at date 1 is
The …rst part of Proposition 1 is proved because
Proof Proposition 2
We now analyze the …rm disclosure choice ( ) at date 1. The …rm's decision problem at date 1 is
The …rst-order condition determines the optimal disclosure policy :
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
We now study the determinants of the optimal disclosure policy by di¤erentiating the …rst-order condition (eqn. 5) with respect to relevant parameters.
The impact of growth prospect g on the optimal disclosure policy ; g ;is determined by g + ( wf ) g = 0:
Thus, g < 0 because g = 2 2 (1 f ) < 0 and ( wf ) < 0 by the second-order condition. Similarly, (f ) g = f g < 0.
Similarly, w = f wf < 0:
(1 g(1 f ) 2 2c ):
2 > 0 if g <ĝ and 2 < 0 if g >ĝ.ĝ is de…ned in eqn. 9. Similarly, (f ) 2 = f 2 and share the same sign. For the impact of the …rm's own information endowment f on its disclosure quality, we consider the total amount of disclosure by the …rm f ; instead of alone.
